A Policy of Active Positive Neutrality: A Necessity for Lebanon

One of the settled features of Lebanese politics is that the eyes of its various political forces and communities stay fixed, to differing degrees, on the world outside: above all on the region, which is itself shaped in varying measure by the international scene and in particular by the role of the great powers in the region. They watch the direction of the political winds and how well those winds suit this or that party in Lebanon. Are they blowing towards more collision and confrontation in all its forms, of which Lebanon is usually a hostage or a victim, bearing many of the costs, costs that usually exceed its capacity? Or towards de-escalation, deals and understandings, temporary or long-term, comprehensive or limited, that bring Lebanon a period of stability, even if one Lebanese party sometimes benefits more than another? The history of Lebanon's wars and conflicts shows that the main detonator has usually been the external factor, because of the political, doctrinal or identity alignments of Lebanese parties with one external pole or another. Lebanon's political geography has always contributed to this, along with the importance, or the attraction, of that position in the regional and international "game of nations". The fragility of Lebanese society has made it easier, with vertical divisions that encouraged or pushed towards those alignments. Lebanon, by its very make-up, attracts and facilitates such alignments with the regional outside. Some saw in Lebanon a "Hong Kong" or the "Switzerland of the Middle East"; for others Lebanon was a "Hanoi" for revolutions of every kind, whatever their banners. The parties and the banners change, abroad and at home, and the Lebanese game stays the same.

If things continue as they are, with paralysis and a grim political crisis over producing a government that has a comprehensive vision and a real commitment to full structural reform, Lebanon today is on the road to collapse or to a social explosion, with grave consequences that will reach everyone.

This calls, as some are urging, for insulating the economic rescue as far as possible from grand policies and choices, and from the game of alignment with outside powers. That is not an easy wager. Saving the Lebanese boat from sinking, as we said in an earlier column, is more than necessary for everyone, and time is not on the side of the rescue: the cost and the difficulty grow with every passing day. But protecting, accompanying and fortifying a national rescue that has not yet begun still awaits the "triad" of an action plan, a road map and a timetable, which the government yet to be formed is supposed to carry and to commit itself to fully. And it remains to a large degree hostage to the regional chess game, and to the bets that Lebanese parties place on it from their different positions. All of this calls on us to think together about how to shape a Lebanese foreign policy based on what is known as active positive neutrality. Lebanon, of course, cannot be a neutral state in the sense of international law, on the model of Swiss neutrality for example. Lebanon is an Arab state, one of the founding members of the League of Arab States, and must of course abide by the Arab constants, especially in the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict, even if those constants weaken or waver at a given moment. Lebanon cannot depart from them. But that does not mean that Lebanon should bear alone, as has been the custom, the burden of being the "Hanoi of the revolution", even if the slogans change from one period to the next.

All of this calls for working out the foundations and rules of a Lebanese policy that rests in practice, and not only at the level of official discourse, on the concept of active positive neutrality. Lebanon must not remain a card or a chess piece in regional conflicts, whatever banners those conflicts carry. Among the foundations and rules that ought to be established, difficult as that is: strengthening the principle of non-interference in the affairs of others, and of not speaking "over the heads" of the authorities of other states in the name of political, ideological or other positions; and genuine respect for, and reinforcement of, the political rules for settling disputes between states, and acting in accordance with them. We need to develop these concepts in order to found a policy of this kind, to which all the national political components commit themselves. In the end it is in everyone's interest, even if one party or another benefits from its absence at a given moment.

And because Lebanon is the state most affected by regional developments and tensions, it has a definite interest in contributing, directly or with others in the region, and sometimes pre-emptively where possible, to the role of firefighter in the region. Some may see this as idealistic, and in truth it is no easy thing. But from a thoroughly realistic point of view this role remains more than necessary if we really want to save Lebanon from remaining a permanent captive of the region's conflicts and confrontations in all their forms. Without it, there will be no real rebuilding of the country and no overcoming the challenges we face at every level, political, economic and social, challenges that are of course linked, overlapping and complementary.

Launching comprehensive economic reform today is more than necessary. But it will remain insufficient unless it is fortified by work, alongside it, on a policy of active positive neutrality, so that Lebanon does not remain a permanent captive of conflicts in which we all take part in different ways, and for which we pay the price in our society, our economy, our security and our politics.